Continued from the Part 1
Table of Contents
65. The problem? Global dysprosium production is barely 1,000 tons per year, and supply is running dangerously low.
66. Dysprosium stands out from the 16 other rare earth elements for two big reasons.
Where in the world is Dysprosium?
67. First, finding commercially viable deposits of dysprosium is extremely difficult.
68. Right now, Myanmar is one of the top producers of dysprosium.
69. The majority of dysprosium mined in Myanmar is sent to China, which relies on these imports for over 60% of its production.
70. China’s heavy involvement in Myanmar’s dysprosium mining regions includes supporting local rebel groups, aiming to gain control in a way similar to Russia’s annexation of Crimea.
71. Other than Myanmar, China’s Jiangxi province is another major source of dysprosium.
72. Outside of Myanmar and China, Russia’s Tomtor deposit in Siberia holds significant dysprosium reserves.
73. However, mining in Siberia is challenging due to its harsh conditions, and with Russia prioritizing oil and gas production, rare earth mining hasn’t been a major focus.
74. Despite their vast resources, neither Australia nor the United States has discovered “commercially viable” dysprosium deposits on their own soil.
Greenland: The Chilly Goldmine
75. Among the known commercial dysprosium reserves, Greenland is one of the few in the Western world.
76. Trump’s push to acquire Greenland wasn’t just about Arctic dominance—it was also about securing its dysprosium reserves.
77. Greenland is home to some of the world’s largest deposits of heavy rare earth elements, making up about 44% of global reserves.
78. The Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez mines are Greenland’s two biggest rare earth sites.
79. Kvanefjeld, located in southern Greenland, holds over 1.1 billion tons of rare earth elements, including both light and heavy rare earths, uranium, and zinc, making it one of the largest deposits in the world.
80. The Tanbreez mine, while smaller at 440 million tons, is especially rich in heavy rare earths like dysprosium, yttrium, and terbium.
81. The Kvanefjeld project was led by Greenland Minerals, an Australian company.
82. Despite being an Australian firm, Greenland Minerals’ largest shareholder is a Chinese company, Shenghe Resources, effectively giving China influence over the project.
83. If Greenland’s ruling party had won the election, the Kvanefjeld mine would likely have been developed under China’s control, strengthening China’s grip on the global rare earth market.
84. Instead, Greenland’s opposition party won and immediately halted the Kvanefjeld project.
85. This election turned out to be a major turning point in the ongoing rare earth competition between the U.S. and China.
86. Meanwhile, the Tanbreez mine was acquired by an American company, Critical Metals (CRML).
87. The Tanbreez mine is estimated to contain 7.6 million tons of dysprosium, making it a key asset for the U.S.
88. Unlike Kvanefjeld, the Tanbreez mine already has mining permits in place, meaning production can begin relatively quickly.
CRML: From Mining to Bitcoin?
89. Even though CRML secured the Tanbreez mine, its stock price has been declining.
90. In 2025, CRML surprised investors by adopting an unusual financial strategy—buying Bitcoin.
91. The company issued $500 million in convertible bonds to purchase Bitcoin, a move that made investors question whether they were straying from their core business.
92. On top of that, CRML also has rare earth investments in Ukraine, which have now been caught in the middle of geopolitical turmoil.
93. The company secured mining rights in Ukraine, but with Russia’s invasion, those rare earth mines are now under Russian control.
94. As a result, CRML is facing the likelihood of losing its Ukrainian assets.
The Ugly Side of Dysprosium Mining
95. The second big problem with dysprosium—beyond its scarcity—is the extreme environmental damage caused by its extraction.
96. In China’s Jiangxi province, the mining process involves digging deep holes into the hillsides and dumping ammonium sulfate into them.
97. This causes the soil to break down into a toxic sludge, which miners then scoop up and carry to processing stations.
98. The sludge is collected in pools where dysprosium is eventually separated from the waste.
99. The problem? Only about 0.2% of the extracted material is usable dysprosium—the remaining 99.8% is waste.
100. These waste materials, known as tailings, often contain harmful chemicals like hydrochloric acid and sulfuric acid, which contaminate rivers and groundwater.
101. The effects on local communities are severe—farmland becomes unusable, fruit trees stop producing, and people suffer from skin diseases, respiratory issues, and even cancer.
102. Producing just one ton of dysprosium generates about 19,800 gallons of acidic wastewater, 1 tons of radioactive waste, and 3.2 million gallons of toxic gas emissions.
103. While dysprosium is especially harmful, other rare earth elements also have significant environmental costs.
Australia’s Rare Earth Strategy: Keeping the Pollution “Elsewhere“
104. Light rare earth elements like cerium and lanthanum are mainly produced by Australia’s Lynas Corporation, which supplies about 12% of the global market from its Mount Weld mine.
105. However, Lynas doesn’t refine these materials in Australia.
106. Instead, they ship the raw materials to Malaysia for processing.
107. This means that while Australia profits from rare earth extraction, the environmental costs are offloaded to Malaysia.
108. Lynas has been working on building a rare earth processing plant in Australia, but strict environmental regulations and worker safety concerns have significantly increased costs.
Trump 2.0. : Greenland, Ukraine, and Rare Earths
109. Trump’s second term is now underway, and securing rare earth supplies is a top priority for the U.S.
110. Even if the U.S. gains access to Greenland’s resources, processing them domestically will be difficult due to environmental restrictions and costs.
111. This is why Trump’s renewed focus on Ukraine is strategic.
112. So far, Ukraine hasn’t been found to have commercially viable deposits of dysprosium or other heavy rare earth elements.
113. However, Ukraine does have deposits of light rare earths, which are more common and easier to mine.
114. The real interest in Ukraine might not be its raw materials but its potential to become a “rare earth processing hub.”
Alphazen Insights
Could Ukraine Become the West’s New Rare Earth Powerhouse? With vast open land—some of it abandoned after Chernobyl—Ukraine might be the perfect spot for rare earth processing. Instead of sending materials to China, the West could set up shop in Ukraine, turning it into a geopolitical goldmine. And if Trump’s strategy is anything to go by, this could be more than just speculation—it might be the next big play in the global tech war.
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