What’s Next in the Russia-Ukraine War? : Part 2
(Feat. Putin, Biden, Trump, Zelensky, U.S., UK, USSR, Nuclear Weapon Threat, Stalin, Donbas, Crimea, Election, World War III, Missiles, North Korea, ICBM, EU, NATO)
Continuing from Part 1
65. After residents of Crimea declared independence as the Republic of Crimea and joined Russia, an unexpected shift began for President Putin.
66. Ukraine’s political landscape underwent a major transformation.
67. With the pro-Russia votes from Crimea gone to Russia, the balance tipped naturally in favor of anti-Russia sentiment.
68. In Ukraine’s democracy, where each person has one vote, the previously balanced pro- and anti-Russia factions now leaned heavily toward anti-Russia.
69. Ukraine’s linguistic demographics reflect this divide.
70. The southernmost Red region on the map is Crimea.
71. The overwhelming Red indicates that most residents speak Russian, marking Crimea as a strongly pro-Russia region.
72. To the east of Crimea, the Red region is Donbas.
73. In Donbas, over 90% of residents also speak Russian.
74. Crimea and Donbas have historically been pro-Russia strongholds, often securing significant support for pro-Russia political forces.
75. However, when Crimea joined Russia, it disrupted the voting balance between pro- and anti-Russia factions in Ukraine.
76. Following Crimea’s departure, protests in Donbas calling for autonomy escalated into a full-scale civil conflict.
77. In February 2015, French President François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel brokered an agreement between Ukraine, Russia, and representatives from Donbas.
78. This was the Minsk Agreement.
79. The Minsk Agreement required Ukraine to amend its constitution to grant autonomy to Donbas in exchange for a ceasefire.
80. In August 2015, Ukrainian nationalist groups began protesting against constitutional amendments that would grant autonomy to Donbas.
81. With anti-Russia sentiment dominant in Ukraine’s government, the Minsk Agreement was not implemented, and Ukraine instead worked to expand its influence in Donbas.
82. By 2019, Ukraine imposed fines for using the Russian language in public spaces.
83. In 2021, Ukraine froze the assets of pro-Russia individuals and organizations, banning their financial activities.
84. Russia demanded Ukraine honor the Minsk Agreement and ensure autonomy for Russian-speaking residents of Donbas.
85. Ukraine ignored these demands, calling its military actions in Donbas a counterterrorism operation.
86. These events laid the groundwork for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
87. Today, Russia occupies both Crimea and Donbas.
88. These are regions where Russian-speaking, ethnic Russians make up the majority. Putin’s goal is to maintain control over these territories while negotiating a ceasefire with Ukraine.
89. From Putin’s perspective, he has “already” largely achieved his objectives.
90. This explains why he continues to propose a ceasefire based on Ukraine halting NATO membership ambitions and allowing Russia to retain its current territorial gains.
91. Donald Trump has publicly stated that he would bring the Russia-Ukraine war to an immediate halt.
92. Details of Trump’s proposed solution are beginning to emerge.
93. Trump’s plan involves suspending Ukraine’s NATO membership ambitions for 20 years, implementing a ceasefire, and establishing a buffer zone along the current front lines.
94. The proposed buffer zone would span 800-miles (1,200 kilometers) and be monitored by NATO forces from EU countries.
95. From Putin’s perspective, this proposal is everything he could hope for.
96. The EU also finds the proposal appealing.
97. The EU’s support for Ukraine isn’t out of affection; it’s about strategic defense.
98. If Ukraine falls to Russia, the vast open plains between Russia and EU countries would leave Europe vulnerable to invasion.
99. The EU’s goal is to maintain Ukraine as a buffer state, while it is indifferent to Russia taking Crimea and Donbas.
100. For Ukraine, however, losing Crimea—a critical Black Sea access point—and Donbas—a key economic region—would be a disaster.
101. If Ukraine is forced to negotiate a ceasefire, fierce battles are likely to erupt in the contested regions, especially near Kursk.
102. When mirrors historical wars, where the fiercest battles often broke out after ceasefire negotiations began.
103. Ceasefire agreements typically set borders based on territorial control at the time of the agreement, incentivizing both sides to maximize their gains.
104. The battle for Kursk, a territory Russia claims was previously theirs, is likely to become the focal point.
105. Russia would never agree to a ceasefire that cedes Kursk to Ukraine.
106. Kursk is also notable for being a region where North Korean troops previously intervened.
107. Should a ceasefire be on the horizon, the fighting in Kursk is expected to intensify, leading to significant casualties among North Korean troops supporting Russia.
108. President Joe Biden is rushing to finalize a $7 billion military aid package approved by Congress before his term ends.
109. This is aimed at bolstering Ukraine’s military strength to gain leverage during potential ceasefire negotiations.
110. Biden’s decision to lift restrictions on using Western-supplied weapons in Russian territory reflects this strategy.
111. The restrictions lifted include offensive weapons with a range of up to 190 miles (300 km).
112. While Moscow remains out of range, Donbas and Kursk now become viable targets for Ukraine’s long-range strikes.
113. Despite the lifted restrictions, the effectiveness hinges on continued Western military support. A reduction in aid would render the policy meaningless.
114. Ukraine likely sees Kursk as a bargaining chip to improve its position in negotiations.
115. In hindsight, Ukraine might have regrets.
116. Ukraine once boasted formidable military strength.
117. Upon gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine inherited a vast arsenal of Soviet military equipment.
118. At the time, Ukraine had 780,000 troops and was the world’s third-largest nuclear power.
119. It possessed 44 Tu-160 strategic bombers, each capable of carrying 10 nuclear warheads over 6,800 miles (around 11,000 kilometers).
120. Ukraine also controlled 1,240 nuclear warheads housed in 176 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos.
121. Its arsenal included 1,081 X-22H Burya cruise missiles, each capable of carrying nuclear warheads.
122. In 1994, Ukraine agreed to denuclearize in exchange for security assurances from Russia, the U.S., and the U.K.
123. The U.S. and U.K. sought to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into terrorist hands, while Russia opposed Ukraine’s nuclear capabilities.
124. This alignment of interests led to an agreement where these powers pledged to protect Ukraine in return for its disarmament.
125. Ukraine trusted this agreement.
126. It dismantled thousands of nuclear warheads and became a non-nuclear state.
127. Ukraine’s military capacity was further reduced, shrinking its tank fleet from 6,500 to 776 and its fighter jets from 1,500 to 208.
128. Today, the very nations that signed the agreement—Russia, the U.S., and the U.K.—find themselves failing to fully uphold their commitments.
129. Ukraine has hinted at nuclear rearmament if NATO membership remains out of reach, but this path is fraught with challenges.
Alphazen Insights
Trump’s pitch to end the Russia-Ukraine war is like a deal everyone hates a little less—great for Russia, decent for the EU, and a nightmare for Ukraine. Meanwhile, Biden’s racing to arm Ukraine before peace talks start, trying to tip the scales. The big takeaway? In geopolitics, promises are like New Year’s resolutions: easy to make, hard to keep.
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