One trusted a promise, the other trusted the wrong man. One gave up nukes, the other secretly built them. In the end, both were left powerless.
It sounds like a spy thriller, but it’s real history. Ukraine believed a handshake deal would protect them. Taiwan thought secrecy could outmaneuver the world’s biggest intelligence agency. Both gambled with their survival—and both lost.
Here’s how two nations made different choices but ended up with the same regrets.
Table of Contents
Ukraine’s Trust Fall: The Budapest Memorandum
1. Ukraine’s critical error? Signing an “Assurance.”
2. In 1994, Ukraine inked the “Budapest Memorandum” with the U.S., Russia, and the U.K.
3. This deal had Ukraine ditching its nukes in exchange for promises about its borders and security.
4. But here’s the kicker: an “Assurance” is just a political pinky swear.
5. Such agreements sound fancy but don’t hold up in a court of law.
6. Break one, and you might get a stern talking-to, but that’s about it.
7. Now, a “Guarantee”? That’s a whole different ball game.
9. In international lingo, guarantees pack legal punch; assurances, not so much.
10. A guarantee is like a treaty with teeth, binding countries to their word.
11. Think NATO’s rule: an attack on one is an attack on all—that’s a guarantee.
12. Breaking a guarantee brands a nation as untrustworthy on the world stage.
13. Ukraine now wishes it had secured a rock-solid guarantee back in ’94.
Taiwan’s Nuclear Ambitions: A Secret Quest
14. Back in 1954, Taiwan cozied up under America’s nuclear umbrella through a mutual defense pact.
15. Still, Taiwan wasn’t about to put all its eggs in the American basket.
16. Why? In 1964, China joined the nuclear club, tipping the military scales.
17. Mao Zedong launched the “Two Bombs, One Satellite” project.
18. Which means, build atomic and hydrogen bombs, and toss a satellite into space.
19. By October 16, 1964, China had its first nuclear test in Xinjiang.
20. Seeing Japan surrender after two atomic bombs in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek sent three physicists to the U.S. to study nuclear tech.
21. But after losing the civil war in 1949 and retreating to Taiwan, Chiang’s nuclear dreams hit pause.
22. Meanwhile, Mao’s China beat Taiwan to the nuclear punch.
23. Inspired by Israel’s nuclear playbook, Chiang started the “Hsinchu Project.”
24. Named after Hsinchu city, it set up a research team at Tsing Hua University.
25. The campus had a U.S.-supplied research reactor, perfect for nuclear R&D.
26. Israel, in the late ’50s, pulled off its nuclear program with a little help from French tech.
27. Taiwan even snagged Dr. David Bergmann, Israel’s nuclear guru, as an advisor.
28. The Hsinchu Project had quiet nods from both sides of Taiwan’s political aisle.
29. But when the opposition cited U.S. pushback, costs, and limited space to argue against it, Chiang shelved the project.
30. He then shifted gears to the top-secret “Taoyuan Project.”
31. Named after Taoyuan County near Taipei.
32. Taoyuan’s Longtan area housed a military research hub.
33. Chiang expanded this into the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology.
34. Officially, they were all about jets, missiles, and electronic warfare, but behind the scenes, nukes were on the menu.
35. To dodge U.S. attention, Taiwan sourced uranium from South Africa.
36. They also imported reactor materials from Canada.
37. A secret underground test site, the Jioupeng Base, was set up in Pingtung County.
38. In 1975, Chiang Kai-shek passed away.
39. His son, Chiang Ching-kuo, took the reins and kept the nuclear project alive.
40. Fast forward to 1979: Deng Xiaoping’s China and Jimmy Carter’s U.S. established diplomatic ties.
41. The U.S. embraced China’s “One China” policy, leaving Taiwan out in the cold.
42. This meant scrapping the defense treaty and nuclear umbrella over Taiwan, offering only the “Six Assurances.”
43. These assurances were like saying, “We’ll sell you some weapons and have your back… sort of.”
The CIA’s Plot Twist in Taiwan’s Nuclear Saga
44. Feeling the heat, Taiwan hit the gas on its nuclear program.
45. By the ’80s, they’d cracked uranium enrichment.
46. Hao Bocun, Taiwan’s military chief and head of the Chungshan Institute, spilled the beans in his memoir.
47. He claimed that by 1986, Taiwan was this close to making nukes.
48. Taiwan had everything—except a solid way to launch a nuke. No missiles, no bombers. Just a bomb that could only go boom at home.
49. A Taiwanese nuclear physicist, He Liwei, worked on the project in the 70s and 80s. Later, he wrote a book called MIT.
50. No, not about the famous American school—MIT stood for “Made in Taiwan.” Clever, right?
51. His book revealed that Taiwan had reached a point where they could assemble a nuclear bomb within days if given the order.
52. But without a real delivery system, it would be more of a self-destruct button than a deterrent. That’s not a great strategy.
53. Enter Chang Hsien-yi. He was Taiwan’s nuclear deputy director and had been working at the Chungshan Institute.
54. With a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering from the University of Tennessee, he was a top recruit for Taiwan’s secret program.
55. But in January 1988, he suddenly disappeared—boarding a U.S. government plane with his family at Taipei’s Qingquan Airport.
56. Three days later, he popped up at the U.S. Congress, spilling every single detail about Taiwan’s nuclear ambitions.
57. The U.S. didn’t waste time. They told Taiwan: “Shut it down in a week, or even the Six Assurances are off the table.”
A Sudden Death, A New Leader, And The End Of Taiwan’s Nukes
58. The day after Chang’s testimony, Taiwan’s leader Chiang Ching-kuo suffered a fatal heart attack.
59. Sure, he had diabetes, but many believe the stress from Taiwan’s nuclear exposure helped push him over the edge.
60. His sudden death left Vice President Lee Teng-hui in charge.
61. Unlike Chiang, Lee had no real power base or strong allies. He had no choice but to give in.
62. Under U.S. pressure, he opened Taiwan’s nuclear facilities to the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency).
63. Within days, IAEA inspectors landed in Taiwan for a special audit.
64. By the end of January 1988, every nuclear-related facility was dismantled.
65. But here’s the kicker: Chang Hsien-yi, the whistleblower, had been a CIA informant for over 20 years.
66. Taiwan thought its nuclear program was a deep, dark secret. Turns out, the U.S. had been watching the whole time.
The Big Lesson: Ukraine Signed the Wrong Deal, Taiwan Hired the Wrong Guy
67. Ukraine’s mistake? Signing a worthless agreement. Taiwan’s mistake? Trusting someone who worked for the CIA.
Alphazen Insights
Promises Fade, Contracts Don’t
When everything’s fine, no one bothers with the contract. But the second things go south, everyone’s suddenly a legal expert, dissecting every word to dodge blame. That’s just how the world works.
Promises? They expire. Words? They get twisted. A bad personality you can manage—but a person you can’t trust? That’s a ticking time bomb.
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