Will Oil Prices Keep Crashing? (feat. OPEC+, Trump, bin Salman, and Supply)

What if falling oil prices aren’t a win — but a warning?
Behind the headlines, a high-stakes power game is unfolding between Trump, bin Salman, and a fractured OPEC+. Saudi is breaking tradition, Biden’s strategy backfired, and oil might just become the world’s next shockwave.
You’re not just watching gas prices drop — you’re watching the start of a global shake-up.
Let’s peel back the curtain.

🛢️ Biden’s Oil Strategy

1. In the inflation-heavy year of 2022, President Biden needed to stabilize energy prices to control the cost of living.

2. He aimed to lower oil prices by negotiating a nuclear deal with Iran to lift its oil export ban and persuading Saudi Arabia to increase oil production.

3. Due to environmental regulations, rapidly increasing U.S. shale oil production was challenging, so expanding external supply was the plan.DW Energy Group

4. Priority was given to bringing Iranian oil back to the market through the nuclear agreement.

🤝 5–11: Diplomatic Hurdles

5. Biden had a strained relationship with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
6. The nuclear deal with Iran was complicated because it involved negotiations between Iran and UN Security Council members, not just the U.S.
7. The agreement aimed to restore a nuclear deterrent plan between Iran and the UN’s permanent members (U.S., UK, France, Russia, China) plus Germany.
8. As the deal neared completion, Russia demanded a full lifting of economic sanctions on Iran.
9. Western countries suspected Russia wanted to use Iran to bypass energy sanctions.
10. Russia’s demands disrupted the nearly finalized nuclear agreement.
11. Consequently, Biden had to pivot from Iran to seeking cooperation with Saudi Arabia.

📞 12–23: Tensions with Saudi Arabia

12. Biden had previously not acknowledged Crown Prince bin Salman.
13. During his campaign against Trump, Biden strongly criticized bin Salman over human rights issues, including the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi and mass executions.
14. While bin Salman wasn’t pleased with the criticism, he could tolerate it.
15. However, after Biden’s inauguration, he offended bin Salman’s pride.
16. Trump had treated bin Salman as the de facto leader and future king of Saudi Arabia.
17. On February 18, 2021, a significant phone call occurred.rudaw.net
18. The U.S. Secretary of Defense called bin Salman.The Balance
19. This was right after Biden stated he would deal with King Salman, not the Crown Prince.
20. Having the Defense Secretary call bin Salman implied he wasn’t recognized as the primary leader.
21. Since bin Salman also served as Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister, the call was positioned as a peer-to-peer communication.
22. Born in 1985 and known for his pride, bin Salman felt insulted and began resisting U.S. policies.
23. He refused to increase oil production during Biden’s visit, leaving the President without the desired agreement.

💼 24–26: Aligning with Trump

24. Subsequently, bin Salman invested $2 billion in Jared Kushner’s investment fund, despite its lack of a track record.
25. Jared Kushner is Trump’s son-in-law.
26. This move signaled bin Salman’s support for Trump starting in 2022.

🔄 27–33: Strategic Crossroads

27. Bin Salman faced a strategic decision.
28. One option was to moderately increase oil production in line with Trump’s expectations.
29. Moderate production increases could stabilize oil prices, but Saudi Arabia needs oil at $85 per barrel to balance its budget.
30. With numerous large-scale projects underway, high oil prices are crucial for Saudi Arabia.
31. Coordinating production cuts with OPEC+ was becoming challenging.
32. OPEC+ members were hesitant to cooperate as before, and some benefited from Saudi Arabia’s production cuts without contributing themselves.
33. Bin Salman considered revisiting the 2015 strategy he executed with Putin, which involved a price war to regain market control.Reuters

📉 34–48: The 2014–2015 Oil Price War

34. In the summer of 2014, oil sales in Asia declined sharply, causing price instability.
35. This was due to China’s economic slowdown.
36. By October 2014, oil prices fell to $84 per barrel, and with increased U.S. shale oil supply, prices dropped to $77 in November.
37. Previously, OPEC would adjust supply to maintain prices around $90 per barrel.
38. In November 2014, an OPEC meeting was held in Vienna.
39. Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi met with Mexico’s Energy Minister, who stated Mexico couldn’t reduce production due to its economic growth phase.
40. Russia’s Energy Minister also indicated no intention to cut production, hoping Saudi Arabia would do so instead.
41. On November 24, 2014, during the OPEC ministerial meeting, Saudi Arabia proposed collective production cuts.
42. However, other countries preferred Saudi Arabia to bear the burden alone.
43. Frustrated, Saudi Arabia walked out, ending the meeting without an agreement.
44. Without Saudi Arabia’s participation, OPEC decided to let the market determine prices.
45. This led to increased production by member countries, further driving down prices.
46. By January 2015, oil prices had halved to $45 per barrel and continued to fall to $25.
47. In February 2016, al-Naimi stated that without shared production cuts, Saudi Arabia would let the market decide prices.
48. Saudi Arabia, with low production costs and substantial reserves, was prepared to endure the low prices.

🤝 49–60: Formation of OPEC+

49. Other oil-exporting countries with higher production costs faced significant challenges.
50. Even Russia, with production costs around $40 per barrel, had to dip into its foreign reserves to cope.
51. In September 2016, during the G20 summit in Hangzhou, Putin and bin Salman held a private meeting.
52. While details are unknown, they reached an agreement.
53. Later that month, an international energy forum in Algeria brought together energy ministers from 72 countries, including OPEC members and Russia.
54. They reached what became known as the Algeria Agreement to cut production.
55. Two weeks later, OPEC members and other oil-producing countries, including Russia, met again in Vienna.
56. They agreed that OPEC members would cut 1.2 million barrels per day, Russia would cut 300,000, and other non-OPEC countries would cut 250,000, totaling a 1.75 million barrel reduction.
57. This new agreement was termed the “OPEC Plus Agreement.”
58. With Russia joining, the group became known as OPEC+.
59. Following these cuts, oil prices began to rise again.
60. Saudi Arabia hoped to replicate this success, but circumstances had changed significantly.

🛢️ 61–66: Shifts in Oil Production

61. New drilling technologies and the Trump administration’s policies led to a rapid increase in U.S. oil production.
62. Despite rising material and labor costs, technological advancements reduced the break-even point for shale oil to the $40 range.
63. While OPEC+ cut 6 million barrels per day over the past three years, U.S. shale oil production increased by 3.34 million barrels per day since 2021.
64. Brazil and Guyana, not part of OPEC+, also increased their oil output.
65. Currently, OPEC+ accounts for only 51% of the global oil market, a significant decrease.
66. Brazil increased production by 400,000 barrels per day in 2024 and plans to add another 400,000 in 2025.

🌍 67–75: Global Oil Dynamics

67. Guyana discovered massive oil fields starting in 2015, gradually bringing them online.

68. Guyana’s oil production jumped from 290,000 barrels per day in 2023 to 600,000 in 2024, and it’s expected to hit 1 million barrels in 2025.
69. So even though OPEC+ is cutting production, the extra oil from the U.S., Brazil, and Guyana is canceling out the effect.
70. On the demand side, China is the big question mark.
71. The International Energy Agency (IEA) believes that if China fully gets its economy moving again, it could need 1.5 million more barrels of oil per day.
72. Sounds like a lot, right? But here’s the catch.
73. Brazil and Guyana together are already adding 800,000 barrels daily, and U.S. shale producers are also ramping up — especially with Trump easing regulations.
74. That means China alone may not be enough to push oil prices up.
75. Even when tankers are attacked by Houthi rebels in the Red Sea, oil prices aren’t jumping like they used to — because supply is so strong elsewhere.

💰 76–82: Cash Crunch in the Kingdom

76. Both Putin and bin Salman need higher oil prices to keep their governments running.
77. Russia produces oil at about $40 a barrel, but because of its war spending, it needs prices over $96 to stay afloat.
78. For bin Salman, Saudi Arabia needs oil at $85 just to balance the budget — and closer to $100 to fund big projects like NEOM.
79. With prices below that, Saudi Arabia is bleeding cash.
80. In fact, they originally expected a 1.6% budget deficit in 2025 — but now it could be over 3% because oil prices have dropped.
81. To fill the hole, Saudi Arabia is slowly selling shares of its national oil company, Aramco.
82. That’s how they’re covering the shortfall — piece by piece.

🔊 83–88: Surprise Twist — Production Goes Up

83. On May 3, 2025, OPEC+ shocked everyone by announcing a production increase of 411,000 barrels per day for June.
84. Wait… prices are dropping, and they’re producing more?
85. That’s the opposite of what they usually do — normally they cut production to boost prices.
86. Some say it’s because Trump is planning a visit to Saudi Arabia this month and asked them to help keep energy prices low.
87. With tariffs expected to raise U.S. import prices, Trump wants to avoid a spike at the gas pump.
88. But let’s be real — Saudi Arabia isn’t exactly rolling in extra cash right now. Boosting output for someone else? That’s unlikely.

🎯 89–99: The Real Target — OPEC+ Discipline

89. A more likely explanation? This is Saudi Arabia cracking down on freeloaders in OPEC+.
90. Some member countries haven’t been sticking to their production cut quotas — but they’re still cashing in when prices rise.
91. Over the past three years, Saudi Arabia has done the heavy lifting, cutting 2 million barrels per day all by itself.
92. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan is actually increasing production — and said it’s putting national interest ahead of OPEC quotas.
93. Iraq and others are also pumping more than agreed, leaving Saudi Arabia to take the financial hit.
94. That’s why OPEC+ scrapped the original plan to increase by just 138,000 barrels — and went for the full 411,000 instead.
95. Insiders say this was a shot across the bow, especially aimed at Kazakhstan and Iraq.
96. These two countries have higher production costs and weren’t following the rules — they kept selling oil anyway.
97. And they don’t have deep pockets, so they’ll feel the most pain if prices stay low.
98. Saudi Arabia seems to be tightening discipline first — and then possibly preparing for a big production cut later this year to push prices back up.
99. But with Brazil, Guyana, and the U.S. all ramping up output outside OPEC+, it’s still unclear whether Saudi Arabia’s game plan will work.

Crude Calm or Storm to Come?

Oil might be sliding, but don’t let short-term bumps fool you.
The real force driving prices down? Supply, supply, and more supply.
Unless Iran pulls a dramatic move and blocks the Strait of Hormuz — which, let’s be honest, would send global markets spinning — we’re looking at a continued downward trend at least through October.

No panic, no magic — just pure oil logic. When barrels flood the market, prices sink. Simple economics, but with global consequences. Stay sharp. The calm may last… unless geopolitics decides otherwise.